Migrating a Zapier or Make automation to a new geocoding host
No-code automations built on a geocoding step need a different migration approach than custom code does. Here is how to handle that switch.
Retiring old API keys safely after a migration
Retiring an old provider's API key feels like a small, almost administrative step at the end of a migration, but getting the timing wrong in either direction carries real cost. Retire too early, before every dependent system has actually moved, and something still calling the old key breaks unexpectedly. Retire too late, or never, and an unused but still-valid credential sits around as a security liability nobody is actively watching.
The safest process treats key retirement as its own small project with a defined sequence, not an afterthought tacked onto the end of the main migration work:
- Confirm zero traffic on the old key first, not just belief that migration is complete. Most providers offer some usage visibility for a given key; check it directly rather than assuming the migration checklist being marked done means the old key has actually gone quiet in practice.
- Leave the old key valid but unused for a defined observation window after you believe migration is complete, rather than deactivating it the moment the new provider goes live. This window, typically a few weeks depending on your traffic patterns and release cycles, catches any forgotten call site, delayed mobile app update, or infrequently run batch job that still references the old credential.
- Deactivate rather than delete the old key first, if your provider supports that distinction. A deactivated key that still exists as a record is easier to briefly reactivate if something unexpected turns up than a fully deleted one, giving you a safety margin during the observation window without extending it indefinitely.
- Delete or fully revoke the old key on a specific decided date, and document that it happened. An indefinitely deactivated key is still a security surface someone could potentially reactivate if the account itself is ever compromised; a genuinely retired credential should eventually be removed for good, not left in a permanent limbo state.
- Audit where the old key was stored, including configuration management systems, secrets managers, environment variable files, and any documentation or onboarding materials that might reference it, since a retired key that is still written down somewhere as "the API key" creates confusion for whoever reads that documentation next, long after the key itself has stopped working.
For a migration onto My Geocode, the new key can be scoped and monitored from day one using the quota headers present on every response, X-Quota-Used, X-Key-IPs-Used, and others documented at /docs/rate-limits/, which makes it straightforward to confirm the new key is actually carrying the traffic you expect before starting the clock on retiring the old one. Treating credential retirement with this level of deliberateness is a small amount of extra process for a meaningful reduction in both operational risk and lingering security exposure.